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2.1  Background to Policy and History Curriculum
In 1996, a Liberal/National conservative coalition was victorious in the Australian 
March general election and coalition leader, John Howard, became the nation’s 25th 
prime minister. Howard’s accession, bolstered by a large majority, came following his 
own long and difficult political apprenticeship and after 13 years of Labour federal 
government. Although focused throughout his next three administrations on the big 
political issue including race relations, immigration policy, Middle East conflict, 
privatisation and industrial relations, Howard still kept time for history, which, after 
small beginnings, began to loom increasingly large in the prime minister’s con-
sciousness. This incipient public attention to history began in 1996 in his Sir 
Thomas Playford memorial speech where he accused “cultural dieticians in our 
midst” of attempting to “rewrite Australian history in the service of a partisan 
political cause.”1 His comments were aimed at academics and others who favoured 
what had already been referred to by conservatively inclined historian Geoffrey 
Blainey as the “black armband” view of Australia’s past. In other words, a view that 
was sympathetic to Aboriginal travails and hostile to some aspects of European 
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settlement in the continent. In October 1996 Howard spoke in parliament of the 
“black armband” view, arguing that “the balance sheet of Australian history is 
overwhelmingly a positive one.”2
History lay in abeyance in the prime minister’s mind as other matters took pre-
cedence, until 1999 when two distinguished professional historians Stuart Macintyre 
and John Hirst (the former leftish by inclination, and the latter rightish) made 
representations about the poor state of history in Australian schools. The federal 
government, following the advice of Education Minister David Kemp, established 
a national inquiry (1999–2000) which clearly showed that, in a majority of states 
and territories, history was an all but invisible subject, inadequately subsumed 
within a generic and controversial approach to social education known as Studies 
of Society and Environment (SOSE).3 The exception was New South Wales, the 
prime minister’s home state, where history was not only firmly on the timetable but 
compulsory in years 9 and 10, where Australian history was allocated a minimum 
of 100 h class time. It was not an insignificant factor in what followed that Bob 
Carr, premier of New South Wales and a traditionalist Labour politician was to be 
recruited by Prime Minister Howard to support conservative concerns about history 
in schools. Carr, a former journalist and a history autodidact, had a serious, almost 
professional, interest in the discipline which he had forcefully carried into his 
state’s education system.
Over the next 5 years, political interest in Australian history built up a head of 
steam in what were to become known generally as the “culture wars” and more 
specifically as the “history wars.” The conflict lay between on the one hand, a 
Blainey-inspired conservative faction led by polemicist Keith Windschuttle, buoyed 
by Rupert Murdoch’s The Australian newspaper and, to some extent, urged on by 
Howard. The other, less politically skilled and less united faction comprised mainly 
bemused historians and excitable pundits who were largely overwhelmed by the 
vehemence and by the media clout of the other side. It was then that a serious politi-
cal crisis intervened and raised the historical stakes.4
2.2  Ideology and School History
The Australian history wars in the first years of the new century followed on from, 
and were similar in character to, conflicts that had divided scholarly opinion, edu-
cators and politicians in the UK and in the USA in the previous decade. In the UK, 
following Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 introduction of a national 
2
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curriculum (under the auspices of education minister Kenneth Baker) and bearing 
in mind Thatcher’s special interest in British (really English) history, an ideologi-
cally based conflict broke out on the grounds, simply put, that there was not enough 
national content in the proposed history programme, it was too left wing in orienta-
tion and contained far too few facts. It was the conservative Daily Telegraph that 
led the UK media charge, a conservative professional historian and political scien-
tist Robert Skidelsky who led the public opinion charge and a previously obscure 
conservative history teacher who led a (small-scale) professional charge. This cam-
paign against perceived leftist influence led to direct intervention by the prime 
minister and her ministers with first versions of the programme modified to suit a 
Thatcherite worldview.5
In the USA, following on from the Bradley Commission’s 1989 publication 
Historical Literacy: The Case for History in American Education and the establish-
ment of national standards in 1994, a furious public debate centred on the conten-
tious, allegedly left-leaning components in the standards was led by a strong, 
neo-conservative faction that included the Wall Street Journal (not, at that time, a 
Murdoch outlet), public figures such as shock jock Rush Limbaugh and high-pro-
file polemicist Lynne Cheney, as well as politicians including Bob Dole and Newt 
Gingrich. The more heated phase of the national debate continued over a 2-year 
period (1994–1996), with the national standards eventually republished in 1996 as 
a far less controversial voluntary programme for US schools.6
In brief, the ideological basis for these history wars was threefold. First, a neo-
conservative view that education systems and cultural outlets were dominated by 
left-wing politics and the 1990s was a decade in which neo-conservatives needed 
to strike back and strike hard. The second motivation for action was a trenchant 
neo-conservative and assimilationist form of nationalism, that was resistant to 
multi-culturalism and to any form of exceptional treatment for new minorities and 
to narrative “relativism”; hence, the emphasis on a single national story at the 
expense of multiple stories and multiple perspectives. A third factor in the cam-
paign against a progressive view of history education was the narrowly didactic 
notion that students should learn the “facts” of history at the expense of dealing 
with historical events as a basis for discussion and well-founded explanation.
2.3  The Australian Initiative for National Curriculum
In late 2005, agitated by ethnic clashes in the Sydney beachside suburb of Cronulla, 
Howard announced that, as part of his government’s drive to bring the different 
ethnic groups in Australian society together, there would be a “root and branch” 
renewal of history education. A point had now been reached where Howard was 
5
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looking to leave a legacy in Australian history, particularly in how it was studied in 
schools, and the “renewal” would help solve a national problem.7
This narrative is therefore a memoir of events that occurred during the period 
2006–2007 when John Howard, attempting to emulate Bob Carr, struggled to intro-
duce compulsory Australian history into the school curriculum across all states and 
territories, at a time when there was no national curriculum. This was to be his 
abiding contribution to the “culture wars between left and right. The dramatis 
personae includes Howard himself (as a neo-liberal with an interventionist and 
special interest in Australian history), federal minister of education Julie Bishop (a 
more centrist and a more pragmatic conservative), a little-known political staffer 
John Kunkel, Geoffrey Blainey, a well known historian and Chris Mitchell, editor 
of The Australian newspaper and confrontational culture warrior-in-chief.”
2.3.1  A Narrative Memoir
During the period 1999–2009, the author has been closely involved in history 
education policy at the federal level as director of the national history inquiry 
1999–2000, director of the national history centre 2001–2007, lead presenter at 
the national history summit 2006, lead consultant in the Howard government’s 
attempt to introduce a national curriculum (sic) in Australian history and as 
co-consultant in the history element of the Rudd government’s national curricu-
lum initiative 2008–2009. However, as with all memoirs, the narrative repre-
sents the author’s views. The suggested significance of the narrative however 
lies in its attempt to portray the inner workings of a conservative government 
in full, ideological cry and the fraught relationship between partisan political 
activity, on the one hand, and professional aims and goals of history educators 
on the other hand.
And, when it comes to history education there are huge numbers involved. We 
are dealing with the minds and hearts of approximately 3.5 million school students 
in Australia, attending over 9,000 schools and taught by almost a quarter of a mil-
lion teachers. All primary school students study historical themes, generally in an 
integrated curriculum, and a massive number of secondary schools students are 
supposed to study history, again, in a variety of formats.
The line taken during the period prior to the Howard government’s third-term 
history initiatives by the history professionals, through both the History Teachers’ 
Association of Australia (HTAA) and the Australian Historical Association (AHA), 
has been that political interference from either side of politics is unwelcome and 
can be resisted by following a clear approach to historical literacy, as developed by 
the National Centre for History Education (www.hyperhistory.org). The literacies 
were endorsed by the HTAA and the AHA in 2005 as a prominent part of a professional 
7
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232 Constructing the Australian School History Curriculum
set of standards; at the time there was optimism amongst some members of the 
professional history community that we were making progress away from the tan-
gled web of political conflict.
The idea behind the standards was to set a professional basis for discussion in 
the face of an anticipated neo-liberal push for curricular reform in which I, at least, 
anticipated the imposition of a simplistic policy view that if school history was 
made compulsory, it would automatically improve student knowledge.8 That was 
until John Howard dropped post-Cronulla, Australia Day 2006 bombshell. In what 
was a strongly assimilationist speech to the Australian National Press Club in the 
Great Hall of Parliament, Howard proposed a major reform in history teaching in 
schools. This, in part, is what he said:
I believe the time has also come for root and branch renewal of the teaching of Australian 
history in our schools, both in terms of the numbers learning and the way it is taught. For 
many years, it’s been the case that fewer than one-in-four senior secondary students in 
Australia take a history subject. And only a fraction of this study relates to Australian 
history. Real concerns also surround the teaching of Australian history in lower second-
ary and primary schools. Too often history has fallen victim in an ever more crowded 
curriculum to subjects deemed more “relevant” to today. Too often, it is taught without 
any sense of structured narrative, replaced by a fragmented stew of “themes” and 
“issues.” And too often, history, along with other subjects in the humanities, has suc-
cumbed to a postmodern culture of relativism where any objective record of achievement 
is questioned or repudiated.9
History was now up for Howard’s neo-liberal “root and branch” renewal.
2.4  The History Summit: August 2006
After his top-down (by implication) and assimilationist Australia Day speech, there 
followed a 5-month hiatus, probably because Howard and his staff and cabinet were 
distracted by other, more pressing, issues and were trying to work out how to make 
the “root and branch” strategy happen.
On 4 July 2006, Julie Bishop opened the next round in top-down negotiations by 
announcing a history summit, scheduled for an unspecified time later in the year, 
and especially set up to found a narrative-based, stand-alone approach to Australian 
history in primary and secondary schools (from years 3–10). Bishop’s language 
was moderate, promising a collaborative approach, but her office had clearly leaked 
8
 The curriculum approach that I was working from was a four stage model: (1) intended curricu-
lum, or the political/administrative agenda hidden and/or public; (2) stated curriculum, or what the 
curriculum documentation says should happen; (3) enacted curriculum, or what actually happens 
in the classroom and (4) realised curriculum, or what students will know and understand. Neo-
liberal attitudes favoured knowledge (facts) over understanding.
9
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to The Australian that a big stick would be used if the states and territories refused 
to come across.10 Meanwhile, Howard said his role would be hands-off, describing 
himself as an “amateur historian.” This became a characteristic feature of the rheto-
ric at that time and later. Howard and Bishop promised collaboration, historical 
balance and multiple narratives, as long as the states and territories did as they were 
told, and agreed to Howard’s vision of Australian history, whatever that might be.
Prior to the convening of what was to become the August 2006 summit, the 
Howard government commissioned me to review the teaching and learning of 
Australian history in schools around the nation. Monash colleague Dr Anna 
Clark and I divided up the national audit and it was then my job to compile and 
write the report, which was very critical of most state and territory history 
provision, especially those jurisdictions that adopted the generic approach to 
social education known as SOSE.11 At that time I was told by an official that 
another report was being prepared by an academic historian, Greg Melleuish, 
from the University of Wollongong, and his report was to form the basis of a 
“national syllabus.”12
It is important to point out that at that stage a very senior official from what was 
then Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) told me on the phone 
that my job was to keep the summit participants’ (later known as the “Summiteers”) 
feet on the ground. The same official also pointed out to me that the prime minis-
ter’s office was concerned about my role because they considered me to be “politi-
cally unreliable.” The impression I got was that senior DEST officials, who have 
to deal with the states and territories on a daily basis, were trying to keep the pro-
cess sensible, sane and professional, while dealing with political demands from 
outside DEST, more from the prime minister’s office but also from the education 
minister’s office.
The Melleuish appointment came as a complete surprise to many historians and 
to all the history teachers I knew. Why was Melleuish selected instead of, for 
example, the much better known John Hirst, who had just spent a decade working 
closely with DEST on school resources? Hirst, a highly regarded and prolific spe-
cialist in Australian history, would arguably have been the first choice of many 
historians and teachers. By contrast, New South Wales-based Melleuish was a rela-
tively unknown academic historian with no background in history education. 
10
 See for example Imre Salusinszky’s article ‘History back in schools’ The Australian, 5th July 
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that The Australian had a pipeline to the PM’s and to Julie Bishop’s offices
11
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So obscure was he that even my New South Wales teaching contacts asked me if I 
knew anything about him. I did not, apart from a vague, residual memory that 
somebody from Wollongong University had once attacked Melbourne University 
historian Stuart Macintyre over Australian Research Council grants, but I was not 
sure it was Melleuish.
It would be an understatement therefore to say that the history teachers that I 
knew across Australia were baffled by Melleuish’s selection. Nevertheless, perhaps 
they were reassured by the Howard government’s announcement that the summit 
would be peopled by historians, and others, from the “sensible centre.”13 Crucially, 
in the pre-summit speech, Bishop revealed the Howard agenda when she com-
mented: “History is not peace studies. History is not social justice awareness week. 
Or conscious-raising about ecological sustainability. History is history, and 
shouldn’t be a political science course by another name. This is a belief I know Bob 
Carr shares and his role in reinstating Australian history as a key subject in NSW 
provides a model for what I believe needs to happen on a national scale.”14
As it happened, any close analysis of the Summiteers, even allowing for the 
presence of such distinguished non-conservatives as Geoffrey Bolton and Ingae 
Clendinnen, would show that the group leaned well to the right. There was also a 
concentration of New South Walers, including a columnist representative from The 
Australian, Paul Kelly and conservative Fairfax Press writer, Gerard Henderson. 
On the other hand, non-invitees included right-wing controversialists Keith 
Windschuttle and Andrew Bolt (controversial shock columnist in Melbourne’s 
Herald Sun), as well as leftish historians Henry Reynolds and Lyndall Ryan. Other 
absentees included Stuart Macintyre (invited, but unable to attend). Crucially, 
representatives from the states and territories were not invited.
In setting up the summit in this way, Howard had sidestepped the states who 
were now were out of the loop, much to their fury. Clearly, Howard and Bishop 
thought they had both the moral weight (who could argue with recommendations 
from the “sensible centre”?) and the political clout (control of both federal houses 
of parliament and an $8 billion per annum Canberra-based schools budget) to carry 
out their intentions.
However, despite characterisations of the summit as a meeting of the “sensible 
centre,” what I subsequently discovered was that invitee Greg Melleuish had strong 
ties to neo-conservative magazines New Criterion (USA) and Quadrant (Australia) 
13Julie Bishop’s pre-summit dinner speech, see ministerial press release 16th August 2006 
‘Forgetting our Past, Failing our Future: the Teaching of Australian History’. Bishop also made 
the following highly significant comment,’ History is not peace studies. History is not social jus-
tice awareness week. Or conscious-raising about ecological sustainability. History is history, and 
shouldn’t be a political science course by another name. This is a belief I know Bob Carr shares 
and his role in reinstating Australian history as a key subject in NSW provides a model for what 
I believe needs to happen on a national scale.’
14




and to the right-wing centre for Independent Studies (CIS). He had also, with 
Australian columnist Imre Salusinszky, co-edited a conservatively inclined volume, 
Blaming Ourselves: September 11th and the Agony of the Left, published by Keith 
Windschuttle’s polemical cottage industry, Macleay Press. Furthermore, Melleuish 
had indeed publicly attacked Stuart Macintyre, in several fairly disagreeable ways, 
in a 2003 review of the book History Wars,15 at the same time taking a personal 
swipe at Macintyre’s co-author Anna Clark, accurately but egregiously accusing 
her of being the granddaughter of a major Australian historian, the “unpleasant” 
(Melleuish’s word) Manning Clark, and inaccurately alleging that she had attempted 
to conceal the fact. This tirade was to be followed by what can only be described 
as a querulous anti-Macintyre rant in the CIS journal Policy. Here is a taste of it:
About Stuart Macintyre’s attitude to Melleuish: “He refuses to name me or to acknowledge 
that I am a professionally trained historian…” About unnamed historians: “Their prefer-
ence is to do their dirty work in secret by ensuring that research with which they disagree 
does not receive funding…” and “Macintyre as the self-appointed shop steward of the his-
tory profession is trying to…argue the case for a closed shop in historical debate…” And, 
in what might be considered an interesting piece of neo-liberal projection: “The willing-
ness of people like Macintyre to subordinate the quest for historical truth to contemporary 
politics.”
If we search for motivation for the rant, we can turn to a professional disagreement 
Melleuish apparently had with Macintyre in 1989 over what constituted good and 
bad history. The two had already differed substantially over a 1988 Melbourne 
University entanglement when Geoffrey Blainey was seen as a victim of leftist 
conspirators, one of whom, it was recklessly alleged by Blainey supporters, was the 
ex-Marxist Macintyre. This anti-Macintyre disposition remains a constant part of 
the Chris Mitchell/The Australian myths-and-fables approach to the history wars.
So why was Greg Melleuish selected? We can only speculate why someone with 
no connection to history education was asked to take on such an important task. 
Remember, this is the first serious attempt by any Australian federal government to 
push through a detailed “national curriculum.” My guess is that there was little 
choice for Howard. Who else would appeal to neo-conservatives and yet avoid 
being seen as an outrageously partisan choice? Windschuttle and Blainey would 
have failed that test. Hirst, who was his own man politically, may have been con-
sidered too close to teachers by Howard’s office. Macintyre was clearly out of 
contention. Melleuish was almost certainly chosen because he had clearly and pub-
licly shown his political leanings and because his relative anonymity meant he was 
a small target for the media. In that way, he could be represented as the dutiful 
scholar rather than as a political advocate.
Perhaps the prime minister was also influenced by Melleuish’s piece in The 
Australian on 30 January 2006, after Howard’s Australia Day speech. “A better way 
of looking at the past” was a Howardite encomium, including yet another ad hominem 
15
 Policy, Summer 2003-04 downloaded from http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/summer03-04/
polsumm0304-7.htm July 2009.
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attack on Stuart Macintyre and which extolled the importance and virtue of the 
Enlightenment and (Judaeo) Christian ethics (which also happen to be two of 
Windschuttle’s many obsessions).16
It seems, therefore, that the History Summit process was nothing less than an 
indefatigable and individual “Quadranteer” being given free rein to construct a 
national programme of study in Australian history, backed by the prime minister 
and by the prime minister’s newspaper of choice, The Australian, led by crusader 
Chris Mitchell. That was the underlying Howard agenda, inadequately concealed 
by the term “sensible centre.”
2.5  Responses to the Australian National History Curriculum 
Summit
At first, there was the cautiously polite and positive view that at last Australian his-
tory was being taken seriously. The summit, it was argued, would inevitably benefit 
the discipline by placing Australian history front and centre in the curriculum. 
More pessimistic observers however regarded the summit as a fix. Cutting the states 
and territories out of the deal, bringing in former New South Wales (NSW) state 
premier Bob Carr as a token Labourite (whose views happened to be close to 
Howard’s on school history) and asking Melleuish to provide a sample syllabus 
were developments seen by some as an attempt to impose a right-wing NSW solu-
tion on the whole of Australia. My NSW teacher contacts thought so. As far as they 
were concerned, with Carr there, the initiative was a blatant attempt by Howard, a 
Carr fan, to copy the state premier’s 1998 introduction of compulsory Australian 
history into NSW secondary schools in years 9 and 10.17
We then waited with bated breath to see what Melleuish would come up with. 
Gloomier colleagues were not disappointed. Melleuish’s draft structured narrative 
for years 9 and 10 gave due prominence to the Enlightenment, just as the prime 
minister had, in his January speech, suggested it should. It also dealt with 
Indigenous history, as Howard also suggested it should. Oddly, but not unexpectedly, 
16
 From early 2006 to mid-2007 Melleuish published nine articles in The Australian, mainly on 
history education topics, clearly not his area of expertise.
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 See, for example, ‘Courses should be designed by teachers not by politicians’ (letters), The 
Australian, 6th July 2006; History’s Forgotten Voices (Anna Clark, opinion editorial), The Age 
15th July 2006; ‘The Return of History’ (editorial), The Age 6th August 2006; ‘History on a 
Pedestal’ (Imre Salusinszky, feature), The Weekend Australian 12–13th August 2006; ‘The whole 
world must be the story’ (Richard Allsop, opinion editorial), The Australian 15th August 2006; 
‘Howard is trying to leave history students stranded in the past’ (Les Terry, opinion editorial), The 
Age 17th August 2006. On August 18th, The Australian had still failed to pick up the errant direc-
tion in which the summit had gone the previous day, see, ‘Summit calls for history classes to go 
back to tradition, The Australian 18th August 2006.
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considering the political context, the topic on the Enlightenment came before the 
first substantive topic on indigenous Australia. The primary section got a few stabs 
at what little children might do.18
All in all there were 49 major topics in secondary, most of them dry and abstract 
in nature. I calculated that it would take well over 300 h to teach this course even 
if you wanted to. Indeed, some of the topics could occupy a whole term’s work. 
True, the programme was not manifestly ideological. My (later) polite public take 
on it was that it was a “worthy effort” by someone who, as a non-teacher, had been 
given a tough job and just did not know what he was doing. In purely professional 
terms, it was as if a little-known schoolteacher had been asked by the Australian 
Research Council to draft its next 5-year plan. And it was this process, disassoci-
ated as it was from conventional professional practice that flagged what the govern-
ment was up to. Howard did not trust the (radical) teachers and curriculum 
designers to do their job and had called in Melleuish, a politically sympathetic 
specialist from an allied but very, very different field to take on the task.
Furthermore, as far as the summit agenda was concerned, my view and the view 
of my colleagues was that, on the day, my job was to provide the anti-SOSE entrée 
and Melleuish was to be the main course. Knowing that was almost certainly the 
case, and having been allocated a 10-min address in the opening stages, I decided 
it was important to try to re-set the day’s agenda. After consultation with a trusted 
NSW friend and ally, the solution was to forestall any summit rubber-stamping by 
drafting an introduction which insisted that whatever came out of the day, it had to 
be teachable, doable and sustainable. In other words, the curriculum must engage 
students and teachers; it must be structured in a way that the topics could be cov-
ered properly and it must be acceptable to the states and territories who would have 
the task of supporting it. Clearly, Melleuish’s proposed syllabus was going to be 
none of these things. It was dry and abstract in nature, it was over-stuffed with dif-
ficult, time-consuming topics and the summit process has already alienated the 
states and territories.
2.6  The Australian National History Curriculum Summit
The seating arrangement of the summit was interesting. Held in one of the large 
committee rooms, the Summiteers were arranged in alphabetical order around a 
rectangle of tables. Geoffrey Bolton and Geoffrey Blainey, being “B”s were sat to 
the left of the chair and I, being a “T” was sat to the right of the chair, and it was 
from this interesting micro-political position that I launched my teachable, doable, 
sustainable attempt to set the agenda. Following my opening remarks, a rambling 
18
 In what was a portent of what was yet to come, the summit organisers had forgotten to nominate 
a primary school representative. After some hasty checking of DEST contact lists, one was invited 
at the very last minute.
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morning’s discussion ensued but the general consensus was that teachable, doable 
and sustainable would constitute the criteria for creating an Australian history 
programme in years 3–10.
The lunch break was brief, but long enough to produce several, intense caucus-
ing groups. It was then Melleuish’s turn to give his ten-minute talk. Oddly, consid-
ering the importance of the occasion, his presentation seemed confused and 
unfocused. During the discussion that followed, Indigenous representatives then 
asked of Melleuish, in a sharp way, where were the Aborigines? In turn, academic 
historians were quick to query the high levels of understanding required by stu-
dents. The three school representatives then rejected the Melleuish framework on 
teachability grounds. The solitary curriculum official (Jenny Lawless from NSW) 
rejected it as well. The only Summiteer who was persistently vocal in support of 
the Melleuish approach was Mark Lopez, another relatively unknown participant 
who had published a book about multiculturalism from a strongly conservative 
standpoint. Henderson and Kelly made sporadic, general points but were clearly out 
of their depth with Henderson apparently distracted by some other task as the rest 
of us debated and argued.
By mid-afternoon, following a barrage of polite criticism, Melleuish’s proposed 
course had been finished off, to his visible indignation. That was when John Hirst 
came up with an improvised “questions and milestones” approach. This concept 
was an attempt to frame Australian history as a set of large questions, within which 
a series of key events would be studied. Hirst’s plan was gratefully accepted by 
almost all there, probably on the grounds that it seemed sensibly broad and there 
was no other option offered. The key event at the summit therefore was the rejection 
of the Melleuish approach and the insertion of an unscheduled, professionally 
devised plan. Interestingly, when Bob Carr, as the afternoon’s chair, wound up the 
summit at 5 p.m., Melleuish, Lopez, Henderson and Kelly, the four Summiteers 
with strong neo-conservative links, went into what I can only describe as an urgent 
and agitated huddle.
2.7  Re-inventing School History: Losing the Plot?
Imagine my surprise when, on the Saturday following the summit (19th August), 
Chris Mitchell’s Weekend Australian published a massive spread “Story of a True 
Blue Country” – a carefully written 2,800-word Melleuish piece, complete with 
impressive graphics of Captain Cook, Indigenous art, Gallipoli and the Whitlam 
dismissal. It was the sort of article that normally might take a week or more to 
solicit, write and edit. It was, however, merely an edited version of Melleuish’s 
paper, as presented, and roundly discarded, on the previous Thursday. The Saturday 
article was published as if nothing unusual had happened at all on the Thursday 
prior. It was as if Melleuish’s programme had not already been summarily dis-
pensed with in favour of the Hirst extemporisation. The Saturday spread then raised 
in the minds of some sceptical observers the possibility that the summit had indeed 
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been carefully staged and that the prime minister’s office, The Australian, and some 
Summiteers, had been in on the act.
Remembering the lessons learned after Labour prime minister Bob Hawke’s 
abortive tax summit in 1985, which ended in embarrassing disagreement, it is 
almost unthinkable that Howard, canny a politician as he was at that stage, would 
set up such a high-profile, 1-day conference unless he had all his arrangements 
neatly in a row. Was it the case therefore that tactics were planned in the prime 
minister’s office, with the proposed Melleuish draft syllabus meant for rubber-
stamping on the Thursday, to be celebrated in triumphant style by The Australian 
on the following Saturday and tweaked by a government-friendly panel in the 
weeks thereafter?
Whatever the case, a question arises. Were the prime minister’s summit organisers 
so very confident that they felt they did not need a fallback position? If so, the PM’s 
office slipped up badly and it was a “whatever were they thinking?” moment, for, 
on the day when Plan “A” failed, there was no Plan “B.” And that is how we were 
left with John Hirst’s Questions (undesirably ambiguous from a neo-conservative 
point of view) and milestones (not enough facts).19 In summary, the summit was a 
combination of an ideologically motivated conspiracy and policy confusion.
2.8  After the Summit
Post-summit analysis in the media produced general puzzlement and some ill-
tempered attacks on the questions (bad) and milestones (too few) by the more vocal 
conservative commentators. Melleuish’s public response to the outcome of the 
summit included a sulky lament in The Australian that a (i.e. his) “great opportunity 
had been missed” (23rd August). Coincidentally, this article appeared on the same 
day that columnist Janet Albrechtsen, culture warrior and Howard-appointed ABC 
Board member, launched yet another neo-liberal personal attack on Stuart 
Macintyre, the supposedly seditious, omnipresent and omnipotent pinko. John 
Hirst, a stickler for courtesy and accuracy, publicly chided the disappointed 
grouches but that did not stop Windschuttle later (Quadrant, January 2007) joining 
in the debate, and, in a wonderful piece of irony, blaming the “failure” of the sum-
mit on an unnamed group of conspirators. His response to post-summit events was 
not too happy either:
The summit appointed a sub-committee to go off and rewrite the curriculum. The sub-
committee has a majority of leftists, including an inevitable Aboriginal woman, Jackie 
Huggins, plus the president of the History Teachers’ Association, Nick Ewbank, who, as I 
noted earlier, has since endorsed a curriculum unit about the SIEV-X sinking.
19
 It is the experience of the author that most conservative politicians have an unsophisticated view 
of history as a chronicle of unassailable facts. While this not a trait confined only to conservatives, 
it is predominant amongst conservative political parties in for example the UK and the USA. See 
for example, Graham (1993), Taylor (1995), Phillips (1998) and Nash et al. (1999).
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In short, the argument here is that, at the summit and on the day, Howard lost 
control of the process. One interpretation might be that in stacking the deck and 
insisting that Melleuish, an educationally inexperienced culture warrior, not an 
educator, be given the key job of designing a national programme, Howard had 
over-reached himself. When the summit went badly off track, and with no fallback 
plan immediately to hand, Howard was unable (at that time) to regain direction of 
a project that was so close to his heart and to his ideological convictions because 
he had promised that the summit outcome would be the solution to all his school 
history problems.
Post-summit criticism of Hirst’s proposals (questions still bad, more facts 
good) were further inflamed by an astonishing claim by Julie Bishop, in her home 
state and speaking at the Fremantle HTAA conference (6 October 2006), that cur-
riculum officials were Maoists. She was indeed all set to say exactly that, as it 
had appeared in her press release the day before the conference, which was that 
history curriculum comes “straight from Chairman Mao” through “ideologues 
experimenting with the education of young people from a comfortable position of 
unaccountability.” My information was that DEST had not vetted the speech 
(almost certainly drafted by one of Bishop’s advisers). Her department hit the 
roof, as did the HTAA organisers and history teachers, and Mao was left out of 
the actual speech delivery but the damage had been done.20 The “sensible centre” 
rhetoric had all but disappeared. Now it was time for Bishop to try to repair some 
of the damage.
2.9  The School History Working Party
After a post-summit hiatus, this time of two months, the summit-endorsed and self-
selecting Working Party of six,21 chaired by DEST Secretary Lisa Paul, spent a day 
in October further developing the questions and the milestones. In the end there were 
about 20 milestones and 13 or so questions. After a further pause of four months, it 
was then my job to take this consultation draft in Australian history (years 3–10) 
around the country as a prelude to agreement by the states and territories.
During this post Working Party consultation process (late 2006–early 2007) 
there was strong pressure indirectly coming from the PM’s office for more “particu-
larities” (i.e. detailed facts) and “biographies.” I felt that these “particularities” were 
20
 See, for example ‘Education hijacked by left-wing, says Bishop’, The West Australian 6th 
October 2006, ‘Fast-talking Bishop shoots from the hip: education groups’, The West Australian, 
7th October 2006 and ‘Little Red Curriculum’ (editorial) The Australian, 14th October 2006.
21
 John Hirst, John Gascoyne (NSW historian); Jennifer Lawless (New South Wales Board of 
Studies); Jackie Huggins (Reconciliation Council); Nick Ewbank (HTAA), and the author. 
Melleuish, when asked by Bishop at the end of the summit proceedings if he would join, vigor-
ously shook his head.
32 T. Taylor
just a demand for yet more facts, and that the biographical angle was a request for 
stories of the great and good. This was puzzling at the time but all was to become 
plain later on.
The early-2007 consultation process involved teachers, curriculum officials, 
academic historians and history educators from across Australia. All state and ter-
ritory departments were consulted. The surprise here was that, on my journey, there 
was a remarkable lack of disagreement about the idea of Australian history as core. 
What concerned many, though, was that the draft was content-heavy and did not 
pay enough attention to local historical developments.
The final version of a 24-page document, Outline of a Model Curriculum 
Framework: Australian History Years 3–10, based on the Working Party draft and 
feedback during the consultation period was sent to DEST in April 2007 and it was 
approved.22 The document had a strong pedagogy section, based on historical lit-
eracy, a primary-level section which outlined four (either integrated or discipline-
based) topics which could move from local to regional to national topics, and a 
secondary-level section which had 10 broad topics-as-questions, 30 milestones 
(with detailed dot points suggesting Investigations) and a reduced number of ques-
tions as studies in depth. The pressure for biographies was expressed in my draft 
as biographical perspectives – on the basis that these give colour to history and 
reduce the tendency to over-generalise experience, which is a common fault at the 
school level.
Although I had reservations about the master narrative implications of mile-
stones, that was my brief and the key thing in the April draft was that there were 
enough significant events (milestones) to give a sense of development but they were 
few enough in number for students to examine them in depth, contest their inclu-
sion and, if necessary, argue for additional milestones. It was all a bit primitive, but 
my job was to work within a political brief and, at the same time, try to keep it 
professional. Then came another Howard bombshell.
2.10  The School History Curriculum Reference  
Group: The Blainey Panel
I was at a conference in Darwin in late June when I got an urgent phone call from 
DEST letting me know that there would be a hastily convened review panel and 
asking me if I would make a presentation to it about the April draft. The most senior 
member of the panel was to be the Geoffrey Blainey (still Howard’s favourite his-
torian), whom I had met several times and who had always been courteous and 
considerate in his dealings with me.
Notwithstanding Blainey’s professional demeanour, I knew what was happen-
ing. My April consultation draft was to be re-shaped by the panel to make it more 
22
 The document was never released.
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in line with the PM’s views. However, I played a straight bat, deciding that it was 
better to stay inside the process than to be outside. Again, there followed a break 
in activity for three months and I was eventually invited to Canberra in early 
September to present to an attentive group comprising Geoffrey Blainey, 
Elizabeth Ward (former NSW private school principal), Gerard Henderson (a 
Howard admirer) and Nick Brown (highly regarded unaligned academic historian 
working on the Australian Dictionary of Biography). None of the panellists was 
a serving teacher.
What later became clear was that the panel, officially known as the Curriculum 
Reference Group but more commonly referred to as “The Blainey Panel,” convened 
as a rescue squad, had been presented with my April draft document with a brief to 
cut it back, forget primary school history and add in “particularities” and biogra-
phies (hence Nick Brown’s inclusion) – all in 1 day. At the same time, the redrafting 
process was underway in the PM’s office, almost certainly under the direction of 
John Kunkel, the PM’s chief speechwriter.23
The panel’s job therefore was, in a single day in mid-September, to meet for the 
first time and review the April draft. Thereafter, the more active panel members 
communicated busily by email and by phone before they came up with a new draft, 
which went off to the PM’s office where it was further vetted and modified. The 
final Howard-Kunkel document was then to be given, by implication as well as by 
explicit prime ministerial statement, the Blainey seal of approval. Realising that the 
Howard’s political machinery would anyway easily roll over any professional 
objections, it was still worth attempting a public, pre-emptive move. Accordingly, 
I wrote a full-page article for The Age (“A roadmap for history’s future,” 10th 
September 2006) in which, amongst many other points, mainly about, political 
interference, I remarked that “if there is no informed teacher involvement in the 
planning process we’ll end up with teacher disengagement, bad Australian history 
and poor student learning.”
2.11  The Prime Minister’s Guide to the Teaching of Australian 
History in Schools
Whatever the case, on 11 October, it was the prime minister, and not Julie Bishop 
the education minister, who launched a glossy Guide to the Teaching of Australian 
History in Years 9 and 10, a document that contained no less than 77 milestones, 
rather than the original 30. Interestingly, as far as the number of milestones is con-
cerned, Howard’s Guide tied in more or less with Carr’s original 1998 NSW Years 
23John Kunkel, economist, trade specialist and writer on trade with Japan, 1995 co-winner of the 
ANU’s economics award, had almost certainly been running the “root and branch” history process 
in the PM’s office since the Australia Day speech in 2006. His involvement might explain why the 
Australia-Japan trade agreement of 1957 popped up from nowhere in Howard’s October 2007 
Guide. Kunkel’s key role in the proceedings was outlined to me by two confidential sources.
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9–10 syllabus which had a slightly fewer 60 topics for study. Furthermore, the questions/
investigations disappeared altogether and over 100 biographies were added, to 
“assist with the study.” Primary-level history had disappeared altogether, as some 
of us suspected it might. We were straight back to the 1998 NSW version.
One telling feature of the new guide was that the prime minister’s view of his-
torical literacy was a very watered-down version of the original, with “moral judge-
ment” dropped altogether and “contention and contestability” (historiography and 
public debate) rewritten as the more anodyne “explain and account for difference 
in historical interpretations.” The whole thing was packed with detail and, although 
it had borrowed some of the April draft’s pedagogy and perspectives, when push 
came to shove it was simply unteachable, if only because of the massive amount of 
content involved. I calculated it would take at least 350 h to teach, and the discur-
sive elements were all but removed.
The overwhelming professional response was that the Howard document was 
part of a game of “political football” associated with his decline in popularity and 
the forthcoming general election. Queensland Premier Anna Bligh commented 
that the document would be seen as “another desperate, last minute effort by a 
prime minister who is in electoral trouble.”24 All in all, I believe the Blainey panel 
was largely a well-intentioned but more tightly controlled mini-summit with, for 
Howard at least, a relaxed and comfortable outcome spoiled only by an election, 
which ironically produced another historical milestone, this time Howard failing 
to regain his NSW seat of Bennelong, the first sitting prime minister to do so 
since 1929.
2.12  What Had Happened to Policy Reform in Australian 
History?
I suggest that Howard knew he had lost control of the initiative back in August 
2006. His plan, prior to the summit, had been to use the occasion to give an impri-
matur to a NSW-style solution, to be written by a trusted neo-conservative aca-
demic historian. On the day, however, the plan fell apart and he was confronted by 
the post-summit wreckage that included Julie Bishop’s impromptu convening of a 
(dangerously) self-selecting Working Party, without even the partial benefit of a 
bitter Melleuish’s inclusion. Having already sold the summit’s outcome as the end 
solution, Howard was unable to disown what had happened and to call off Julie 
Bishop’s Working Party. He allowed the consultation process to take place, with his 
office monitoring and attempting to intervene in the drafting process. When the 
April 2007 draft was approved by DEST and by Bishop, Howard took it out of their 
hands, commissioned John Kunkel to workshop a ghost draft in his office, allowed 
24
 See, for example, ‘States mistrust the intent of Howard’s history plan’, The Age, 10th October 2006 
and ‘Howard’s way fails school test’ (Tony Taylor, feature article), The Age 14th January 2008.
352 Constructing the Australian School History Curriculum
the panel to do their own rapid fire workshopping. This joint endeavour involving 
the Blainey panel gave the Guide unassailable credibility. What Howard and 
Kunkel did not tell the panel was that the PM’s office would hijack the panel’s 
recommended 77 optional milestones and turn them into compulsory topics, much 
to the fury of several panel members.25 The upshot was that, by October 2007, the 
original pre-summit scheme of Australian history years 3–10 had been all but 
reduced to the last 2 years of compulsory education. Years 9 and 10 were clearly 
the only sections of schooling with which the Howard government considered it 
worth bothering.
The timeline is important here. The Blainey panel met on 18 September. The 
Guide was launched, amidst the election campaign, on 11 October, a mere seven-
teen working days later. This was not solely the product of a group of four at a 
hectic one-day meeting (plus follow-up), but the joint product of two teams run-
ning in parallel. One team, the Blainey panel, was unaware of the other’s exis-
tence. As in Conan Doyle’s The Silver Blaze, when the significant point was that 
the dog did not bark in the night, Julie Bishop never denied that the matter had 
been taken out of her hands nor did John Howard ever deny that he had a major 
hand in the final product.
Interestingly, John Hirst published an article in a recent edition of the leftish 
Monthly.26 The gist of his article was that he had been asked to write an “official 
history” for the Immigration Department’s new citizenship process. Contrary to the 
official line, he produced a theme-based, not a narrative-based official history 
which at first was blocked but later accepted after some serious to and fro with the 
Prime Minister’s office. John Hirst’s article details the close involvement of the 
PM’s office in redrafting his version of events, a story that is consistent with post-
summit behaviour. At the same time, even Geoffrey Blainey, history champion of 
the conservative side of politics, condemned supposed political interference in the 
awarding of the 2006 prime minister’s $100 000 history prize. Blainey was chair of 
the prize selection panel (the panel also included Greg Melleiush) and the Blainey 
outburst undoubtedly implied that the interference, about how the prize was to be 
allocated, came from the prime minister’s office.27 Attach Blainey’s concerns about 
political interference in the awarding of the inaugural prime minister’s history prize 
to Hirst’s immigration exasperation and the interventionist summit process, and 
you can see a strong behavioural pattern emerging.
25
 Information based on confidential discussions after the panel was disbanded.
26
 ‘Australia: the Official History’, The Monthly February 2008.
27
 The two worthy final contenders were freelance history Peter Cochrane with his book Colonial 
Ambition, a highly regarded study of NSW colonial-era politics, and Les Carlyon’s journalistic 
The Great War, which, interestingly, contained three footnoted references to the Howard family, 
with one footnote each to father and grandfather who served in the same battalion during that war. 
The Australian article ‘Rudd to award Aussie writers’ 5th December 2007, details the Blainey 
criticisms and the new Labor government’s subsequent switch to a $100,000 literary prize.
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In summary, what we witnessed in 2006–2007 was a period when, in a major 
case of high politics, five individuals – the former Prime Minister Howard, one of 
his senior advisers, Kunkel, a staffer in Julie Bishop’s office,28 an obscure 
Wollongong historian, Melleuish and an editor at a major opinion-consolidating 
newspaper, Chris Mitchell29 – attempted, in different ways, to become the coercive 
owners, string-pullers and propagators of a crude, fact-based version of Australian 
history education. Of that group of five, none was an educator, all were men and 
none was Indigenous. This ambitious scheme, to impose a NSW model on years 9 
and 10 was embarked upon notwithstanding the sincere efforts of most of the 
Summiteers, all of the members of the 2006 Working Party, all of the 2006–2007 
consultees and the committed educators and professional historians of the Blainey 
panel, with a section of the latter very angry that they had been taken for a ride.30 
Clearly, during the Howard era, school history was far too important to be left to 
teachers, to women, to Aboriginal representatives, or even to the historians.
2.13  Conclusion
In the new scheme of things, under a 2007 Rudd Labour government, national cur-
riculum has again been taken up but, learning from the lessons of the past, this time 
initially under the management of a National Curriculum Board (NCB). The NCB 
(from 2009, known as the Australian Curriculum, Assessment and Reporting 
Authority or ACARA) works safely at arm’s length from federal government inter-
ference, sensibly introducing reform in all major study areas and firmly involving 
states, territories, teachers, parents and other interested parties in the planning pro-
cess. In the new regime, history has become one of four core areas, along with 
English, mathematics and science, and the design of the new history curriculum is 
firmly in the hands of historians, teachers and history educators, not within the 
grasp of politicians, staffers and crusading journalists.
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3.1  History Wars in Greece: Introduction
It seems surreal now that such a small book, of only 136 pages, between 2006 and 
2007, could have contributed towards inter-party strife within the ruling Greek 
government; its reduced majority at the election of 16 September, 2007; the failure 
by the Minister of Education, Marietta Giannakou, and her deputy minister 
George Kalos, to be re-elected to parliament; the hostility of the Church of Greece; 
the rise of the ultra-right-wing nationalist party of L.A.O.S., which won, for the 
first time, 10 seats in Greece’s 300-member chamber of parliament; enormous 
media spotlight and the chagrin of many teachers who systematically refused to 
teach the contents of the book, not to mention the opposition of many ordinary 
people. The book, in question, was the 2006–2007 school history textbook for year 
6 primary school which was written under the supervision of Maria Repousi from 
the University of Thessaloniki.
It was introduced as the new main school history textbook, for that level, in all 
government primary schools, in September 2006. Its contents primarily included 
an examination of the history of Greece from the 1400s until approximately 1981. 
It addressed the rule of the Ottoman Empire over Greece, the Greek war of Indepen-
dence (1821–1827) against the Ottoman Empire and the history of the new Greek 
state post 1827 until the present, with special concluding emphasis on Greece’s 
admission to the European Economic Community (1981).
The purpose of this study is to investigate, through an analysis of the controver-
sies surrounding that textbook, the new ideological and methodological develop-
ments in teaching history in primary schools, between 2006 and 2007, in Greece. 
As a harbinger of new ideologies which challenged the traditional narrative of 
modern Greek history since the 1970s in school history textbooks, the 2006–2007 
year 6 school history textbook became the symbol of innovation, for many, in val-
ues and methodology. This is because it sought to ideologically re-position a new 
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